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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S MONOPOLY POWER
AND THE NEGRO LEAGUES
*ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON

Fifty years have passed since Branch Rickey lured Jackie Robinson
from the Kansas City Monarchs to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers.
Nearly thirty years have passed since the Indianapolis Clowns, the last
surviving Negro League team, closed its doors and ceased to play ball.
Historians attribute this failure to integration. This article challenges
that view. It is true that the very existence of teams of Black players
(usually with Black owners) was due to the exclusion of Black players
from "Organized Baseball."' The formation of the Negro Leagues also
resulted from, but did not necessarily occur because of, the purposeful
segregation of the Major Leagues. "heir establishment was driven by
economics; team owners were trying to improve the quality of their
product and profitability. Whatever the cause for their existence, the
survival of organizations like the American Tennis Association (ATA),
the Harlem Globetrotters and Black college sports in general
demonstrates that the demise of the Negro Leagues was not a n
inevitable consequence of the Major Leagues' inclusion of Black players.

* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. An earlier version
of this article was presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study
of Afro-American Life and History. I wish to express my appreciation to my research
assistant, Keith Borden, a proud Morehouse alumnus, without whom the completion of this
article would not have been possible.
' See infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing Major League Baseball's failure
to accept negro players).
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This article argues that the demise of the Negro Leagues was caused
by the confluence of several factors. First, the Negro Leagues operated
with weak relational contract structures, a condition exacerbated by
their over-reliance on star players. Second, and perhaps most important,
integration forced the Negro Leagues to compete in a market dominated
by the monopoly power of the Major Leagues. By 1922, perhaps earlier,
the Major Leagues had acquired a monopoly over the market for White
professional baseball players in the United States through its reserve
system. Thereafter, the Major Leagues strengthened that monopoly
with the development of Branch Rickey’s other great innovation: the
development of the minor leagues as the farm system for the Major
Leagues. Finally, the owners of the Negro Leagues appear to have
accepted the inevitability of extinction.
This article first describes the relational contract structures of the
Negro Leagues. Second, it examines the possible circumstances under
which the Negro Leagues or some remnant could have survived after the
integration of the player market. Third, the article describes how the
Major Leagues acquired and maintained a monopoly over the market for
White professional players through the reserve system, and the
subsequent inclusion of Black players. That part further explains how
the use of that monopoly power destroyed the Negro Leagues. Finally,
the article discusses various legal strategies that the Negro Leagues
could have used in trying to survive.
RELATIONALCONTRACTS IN THENEGROLEAGUES
Several books have been written about the Negro Leagues and their
players. These books provide much of the memorialized history of the
formation and operation of the leagues. The term “Negro Leagues” often
is used rather loosely to refer to teams of Black professional players with
mostly Black owners operating in the United States between 1880 and
1955. The term is used here to refer t o the formal leagues, particularly
the Negro American and National Leagues.’ Most Negro teams
operated independently and were not affiliated with a formal league.3
The earliest teams engaged in barnstorming sport. The teams traveled
the country playing local teams, both Black and White. Many combined
showmanship with the game to boost a t t e n d a n ~ e . Frequently,
~
the
games were significant social events in Black communities. Even those
teams that were members of formal leagues barnstormed before, during

Teams of the Negro Ixugues, (updated May 28,1996)<http://www.nc5.infi.net/-moxie
/nlb/teams/teams.html >.
Id.
RILDIXON,THE NEGROBASEBALLLEAGUES:A PHOTOGRAPHIC
HISTORY 20-23(1994).
Id. at 18.

1998 I Major League Baseball's Monopoly Power I 2 9 3

and afler joining leagues. The Kansas City Monarchs, who introduced
night baseball in 1930; and the Indianapolis Clowns were two of the
most successful barnstorming teams.7
Any business firm, in order t o be successful, needs continuous
relationships with employees, suppliers, landlords, financiers and
owners. In the American economy, these relationships are reflected in
various contractual arrangements that have been described as
"relational contracts,"because they provide for or establish a framework
for a set of transactions over time.' Professional baseball, whether
involving barnstorming or otherwise, requires relational contracts with
other teams and arena owners, financiers and players. Contrary t o
popular connotations, the relational contract structure of the
barnstorming operations of Negro teams was quite organized.
Arrangements among teams and facility operators were made through
a system of booking agents at least one year in a d ~ a n c e . ~
The reliability of the booking agent system, however, did not mean
that the arrangements were not costly. For Negro teams, scheduling of
barnstorming games posed other problems. The teams confronted
obstacles in obtaining suitable playing facilities.
In Modern
Amusements, Inc. u. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.," for example, a
booking agent arranged for games between two Negro teams with the
lessee of a baseball park. A fight occurred during the first game which
required police involvement. The park was located in a White
neighborhood and the lessor responded t o the altercation by invoking a
clause in the lease requiring the lessee t o observe "all rules and
regulations prescribed by the lessor."" Specifically, the lessor issued a
regulation prohibiting any more games in the park between Negro
teams. The court upheld the regulation but explained:
But, considering that the park was in a neighborhood of residences
occupied by White families, and considering that the first and only
game of Negro baseball played in the park brought on a fight and a
disturbance of the peace, and considering that the lessor, being a public
service corporation, was necessarily solicitous of the good will of the
public, our opinion is that the proscribing of Negro baseball games in
Kempster Park at night was not an unreasonable rule or regulation."

Id.at 149-51.They carried a portable lighting system with them.
Id.at 20.
' Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.L. REV.
1089,1091 (1981).
' DIXON,supm note 4, at 23.
165 So. 137 (La. 1935).
'' Id. at 139.
la Id. at 139-40.
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Some teams rented Major League stadiums for their own games and
played when the Major League team was not in town. The use of
facilities by Negro teams also surfaced in a rent dispute between the St.
Louis Cardinals and their landlord. The Cardinals unsuccessfully
asserted that they were entitled to an offset for the use of the lighting
system jointly owned by the Cardinals and the St. Louis Browns during
“Negro exhibition games.”13 The likely ultimate effect was an increase
in the rent charged to Negro teams. The practice of renting Major
League facilities continued after the Negro League era. Some teams
apparently constructed and owned their own fa~i1ities.l~
Not only did Negro teams have to face arenas which were off limits
due t o stereotypical fears,15they also had to find places t o play with
segregated seating. Satchel Paige refused to pitch in the Kansas City
stadium unless the segregated seating restrictions were removed during
Negro League games.I6 Players also encountered segregated accommodations while traveling. l7 Teams also faced t o r t liability from which
White clubs were not immune. la In some cases, however, the lawsuits
were filed against the owners or regular lessee of the parks. Even
though the teams may not have been sued, such suits no doubt raised
the cost of renting stadiums for them. Consequently, Negro League
teams faced the daunting task of playing numerous away games to
increase revenue and incurring additional costs in the process. The
additional costs left less money to pay the players to compete in an
integrated players’ market.
Despite the profitability of barnstorming, it did not offer the quality
of product and growth potential of league sport. This observation is
amply demonstrated by the history of the Harlem G10betrotters.l~

l3 Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat’l Baseball Club, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 321, 325
(Mo. 1951).
l4 The Memphis Red Sox owned their stadium, Martin Park, but were one of the few
teams to do so. Teams ofthe Negro Leagues, supra note 3. See also Frisby v. Grayson, 63
So.2d 96 (Miss. 1953) (dispute involving the construction of ballpark for Blacks).
l5 See Dudley v. City of Charlotte, 27 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 1943) (unsuccessful action to
enjoin the City of Charlotte from maintaining a recreational park for Negroes on property
near a White neighborhood).
l6 DMON,supra note 4, at 197.
Id. a t 164
’* See, e.g., Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, Inc, 229 P.2d 329 (Wash.1951) (suit brought
by fan hit by ball hit over protective netting in game involving Kansas City Monarchs);
Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc, 72 A.2d 239 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950) (suit brought by
bypasser struck by baseball leaving the park). For a similar case involving the Harlem
Globetrotters, see McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters, 365 P.2d 918 (N.M. 1961).
l9 See infru notes 61-68 and accompanying text (describing early days of the Harlem
Globetrotters).
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Although league sport does involve teams traveling across the country,2o
league sport is a very different product.
The product of a sports league is not merely a series of isolated games
unrelated to one another. The NFL, for example, produces a n annual
series of interrelated football games involving all of its twenty-eight
member clubs, annual division championship races, a nine-game
postseason playoff tournament, and ultimately a Super Bowl game and
league champion.**

One court described league sport in the context of professional baseball
similarly:
The function of each league was to regulate contests between teams
representing the several clubs in the league, which compete annually
for championship [sic]. . . . The club which wins the championship
pennant in any year in one major league competes for the world's
championship in that year with the winner of the pennant in the
other."

League sport involves stronger relational contracts among teams and
arena owners than barnstorming. As reflected in David Wyatt's famous
call for Negro league sport on a national basis, it also leads to stronger
relational contracts with fans.23

*O Federal Baseball Club v. National League of F'rofl Baseball Clubs, 259 U S . 200,208
(1922),a f g 269 F.681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
" Gary R.Roberta, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section
1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 219,229(1984).
Federal Baseball, 269 F.at 683.

23

We have players who can bat and players who can field. We have players who

can pitch and who can run, we have magnates with the glad hand, also the baseball
fan; we have coaches who can make a lot of fun. We have umpires, we have scribes,
the latter to criticize; we have cranks and also enthusiasts; but of all this, the one we
need most is the man who will say, 'Let's organize.'
Big leagues all have grounds and players of wide renown; they have their
Wagners and their Crawfords and their Stahls; they have magnates with money to
burn and others eager to earn. They are organized and that's the best of all. They've
got us on the run in this game, more work than fun. This fact, no doubt you have
surmised, so while running in this race, why not keep up with the pace? Get
together and proceed to organize.
The importance of this plea sooner or later you11 surely see,that it's timely and
directed a t the right place; so while you have the chance, accept opportunities to
advance and uphold the rapid progress of our race. The game is honest, the game
is square,a point we all declare, so we need not dwell on that at any length; h m out
of our slumber let us arise and treat our friends to a grand s u r p r i s e b e up and
doing! Let's organize.
quoted in DMON,supra
David Wyatt poem "Let'sOrganize" in the March 5,1910FREEMAN,
note 4,at 104-5.
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The most significant proponent of Negro league sport was Rube
Foster, the founder of the Chicago American Giants. He ultimately
persuaded other owners to form the Negro National League in 1920.24
They also formed a governing body called the National Association of
Colored Professional Baseball
League play meant league
competition, with games against other league members resulting in a
championship. The Eastern Colored League was formed in 1923 and
disbanded in 192ELZ6The Negro National League suffered financially
during the Depression Era, failed in 1932,27and was revived by Gus
Greenlee in 1933.28The Negro American League was founded in 1937
by J.B. Martin.29 The Negro National League engaged in the Negro
World Series and all-star games with the Eastern Colored League and
the Negro American League. There were numerous other leagues,
including the Negro Southern League.
Although the Negro Leagues provided organization, they lacked
strong relational contract structures.30 The production of league sport
requires two distinct layers of relational contracts.3l First, team owners
must associate to form the league, establish league objectives and
design the league product. Each owner then must enter into a second
layer of contracts with players, stadium landlords, financiers and
suppliers. In the league, each team owner is subject to the viability of
the second layer of contracts of other team owners. This structure
contrasts with barnstorming sport, under which the first layer was
established through booking agents, and individual teams were not
dependent upon the second layer structures of other teams. If a team
failed, a barnstorming team could simply line up another team through
the booking agent.
The relational contracts among owners were weak in the Negro
Leagues. Teams were not committed exclusively t o playing in the
league, but continued to engage in barnstorming with non-league teams
as gate receipts provided the largest source of revenue.32 The

DIXON,supra note 4, at 123.
Id.at 124.
" Id. at 21.
24

25

Id. at 151.
Id. at 158-59. The governing organization was named the National Association of
Professional Baseball Clubs, which was identical to the governing organizationof the White
minor leagues.
Teams of the Negro Leagues, supm note 2.
30 See supm note 8 and accompanying text (describingprinciples of relational contracts).
31 See Alfred D. Mathewson, IntercollegiateAthletics and the hsignment of Legal Rights,
39 ST.LOUIS U. L.J. 39,39-40 (1990) (explaining relational contracts in a collegiate sports
context).
32 GEOFFREY
C. WARD,
KEN BURNS& Jm O'CONNOR,SHADOWBALL:A HISTORY
OF THE
NEGRO
LEAGUES 15 (1994).
"
"
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barnstorming operations thus served as a hedge against the risk that
other league teams would fail. Accordingly, individual teams needed to
schedule as many games as possible, and league games comprised only
a fraction of the total games each team played.33 The result was that
each team played a different number of games. Because team owners
were unable to rely on the league’s economic structure for financial
success, the associational glue was not strong and owners moved in and
out of leagues at will?4
Relational contracts between teams and players were even more
problematic. In Major League Baseball, star power and team synergy
were essential ingredients of the league product marketed to the public.
The American and National Leagues offered competitions among teams
of professional ballplayers. They cultivated team personalities and
developed fan loyalty. Murderers’ Row, the Gas House Gang and the
Bronx Bombers are all too familiar monikers for team personas. The
importance of star appeal and team synergy was pivotal in the landmark
case ofPhiladelphia Ball Club u. Laj0ie.3~In that case, Napoleon Lajoie,
a great White player, entered into a contract with a Cleveland team
while under contract with a Philadelphia team. Cleveland offered him
more money. The Philadelphia team sought an injunction prohibiting
him from playing for Cleveland. Its argument was based on his value
to the team. That value was based on two things: his star appeal and
his importance to team synergy.
[Lajoie]is an expert baseball player in any position; . . . he has a great
reputation as a second baseman; . . . that his withdrawal h m the team
. . . would probably make a difference in the size of the audiences
attending the game. . . . He has been for several years in the service
of the plaintiff club. . . . He has become thoroughly familiar with the
action and methods of the other players in the club, and his own work
is peculiarly meritorious as an integral part of the team work which is
so essential. . . . Lajoie is well known, and has great reputation among
the patrons of the sport, for ability in the position which he filled, and
was thus a most attractive drawing card for the public. He may not be
the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a bright
particular star.=

The Major Leagues suppressed the price of that value through an
extremely strong employment contract structure in the form of its
legally protected reserve system.

33

Id.

’‘ Id. at 18-22.
36

36

51 A. 973 (Pa.1902).
Id. at 974.
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The historical record shows the substantial reliance of the Negro
Leagues on the star power of players such as the incomparable Satchel
Paige, Josh Gibson, James “Cool Papa” Bell, Oscar Charleston and Judy
Johnson. The significance of star power is amply demonstrated by the
relative popularity of the Negro Leagues’ annual all-star game compared
t o their World Series. The All-star game always outdrew The World
Series.37The only plausible explanation for that popularity differential
is that the All-star game showcased numerous stars whereas the World
Series featured only the handful of stars found on the two competing
teams. The historical record also shows not only the inability of Negro
League teams to afford team synergy, but an extremely weak
employment contract system. Not only did the Negro Leagues not have
a reserve system, but written player contracts were the exception rather
than the rule. A team that became successful and developed its players
into stars was sure to lose them. Accordingly, the Negro Leagues
featured true unrestricted free agency. A star was able t o sell his
services to the highest bidder a n y ~ h e r e . ~When
’
the Negro League
season ended, players went south to the Mexican League and to the
Dominican League, where they were welcomed with open arms.
The free agency system in the Negro Leagues was consistent with
a cultural value disfavoring limitations on the freedom of individuals to
choose their employer^.^' This cultural value was at the heart of Curt
Flood’s challenge to the reserve system.40 In addition to the antitrust
claim on which the Supreme Court and the lower courts decided the
case, Flood alleged that Major League Baseball’s reserve system violated
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary
servitude:l The legal claim was founded upon a statement in Pollock u.
Williams,” that the “undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment . . .
was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely
Professional
free and voluntary labor throughout the United
baseball players subject to the reserve system could not provide their

37
38

DIXON,supra note 4, at 20.
Satchel Paige has been described as a notorious free agent, even when under contract.

DIXON,
supra note 4 at 168-74. Josh Gibson also took advantage of the true free agency
JOHN B. HOLWAY,
JOSHGIESON 61 (1995).
that existed in the Negro Leagues.
Notwithstandingthe free agency that existed, player salaries were lower than those in the
Major Leagues. DKON,supra note 4, at 241.
See generally Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture and Contract Law: From the
Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV.1 (1995) (describing African-American
attitudes toward contractual limitations on employment).
40 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (listing Flood’s challenges to Major League
Baseball’s reserve system).
41 Id. at 265-66.
42 322 US.4 (1944).
Id. at 17.
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services freely to the employer of their choice. Most players entered the
industry through the player draft pursuant t o which Major League
teams picked players who were not yet under contract to any team.
Once a player was drafted, he could contract to play only for that team
or for a team to whom the drafting team assigned its rights. The player
could not unilaterally choose t o play for any other team. A player who
avoided the draft could contract with the team of his choice, but once he
signed, he could play only for that team or a team to whom his contract
was subsequently assigned. "he reserve system thus obviated the right
of the player to choose his employer. It was this condition that Curt
Flood found so unacceptably onerous that he was willing to give up an
annual salary of $100,000 per year and his career in professional
baseball.
The cultural attitude was reflected in Jackie Robinson's testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Committee on the Judiciary in 1958. Six star players appeared before
the Subcommittee, but Robinson was the only one who criticized the
reserve system.
I think they [players] should in some way be able to express
themselves as to whether or not they want to play for a certain ball
club. I am highly in favor of the reserve clause. I do not want to get
this out that I don't believe there should be some control. But on the
other hand, I don't think the owners should have all of the control. I
think that there should be something that a ballplayer himself could
say that would have some effect upon his particular position with a ball

Robinson's concern was that the reserve system prevented players who
were not stars from exercising choice so as to better their careers and
value.46
Cultural attitudes on the freedom of workers to choose their
employer also were reflected in the actions of Negro League owners once
the Major Leagues started signing Black players. The owners of the
Negro League teams were confronted with a quandary. On one hand,
they did not want to stand in the way of the freedom of their players to
better themselves, but on the other, they were fighting for their survival.
Until the Robinson signing, the Negro Leagues lacked a reserve
In fact, many teams did not use written contracts until after
Branch Rickey refused to pay compensation to the Kansas City

Hearings BefoTe the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee
on the Judiciay, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 295 (1958) [hereinafterHearhgs] (statement of
Jackie Robinson, formerly with the Brooklyn Dodgers).
'' Id. at 296.
'' DIXON,supm note 4, at 88.
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Monarchs after signing Jackie R~binson.~'
J. L. Wilkinson, the owner
of the Kansas City Monarchs, was famous for his handshake contracts,
and Rickey cited the lack of a written contract as a reason for rehsing
t o pay. He also cited the well known ties of several Negro League
owners t o the numbers racket.48
In another famous incident, Effa Manley, the owner of the Newark
Eagles, demanded compensation from the Dodgers, who wanted to sign
Rickey responded
Monte Irvin who was bound by a written contract:'
by criticizing her publicly for standing in the way of the player.5o She
~~
the
refused to back down and received c ~ m p e n s a t i o n . Thereafter,
Negro Leagues required a uniform player contract so that teams could
receive compensation when their players were signed by Major League
teams. The uniform player contract was thus not used to stifle player
choice, but t o obtain compensation from the Major Leagues for the loss
of a talented player. The Major Leagues eventually avoided the cost of
buyouts from Negro League teams by recruiting Black players out of
high school.52
One advantage of a league is the centralized scheduling of league
games.63 It is a league expense paid by member clubs in some fashion.
The Office of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball is funded by
the Major League teams and one of its more thankless responsibilities
is scheduling." The Negro Leagues, however, continued to use the
booking agent system. When Rube Foster organized the Negro Leagues,
he attempted to centralize this function and served as booking agent for
the League for a controversial five percent fee.55
In addition to the weak contracts among owners, associational
contracts among owners and the employment contracts with players,
financial relationships provided limited access to capital resources.
Some owners were individuals, like Bill "Bojangles" Robinson, who
became wealthy from other business endeavors. Several owners had ties
t o the numbers racket.56 At least one club tried raising h n d s through

4'

Id. at 287.
JAMESBANKES,THJ~PITTSBURGH
CRAWFORDS: "HE LIVES

AND TIMESOF BLACK
BASEBALL'S MOST EXCll"G TEAM! 91-99(1991).
'' DIXON,supra note 4, at 305-6.
50 Id. at 306.
51 Id.
'* BANKES, supra note 48, at 143.
53 Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Pmfl Baseball Clubs, 269 F. 681,683
(D.C.Cir. 19201,affd 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
54 Steve McClellan, Cubs Balk at Vincent Move; Team Owner Tribune Files Suit to Block
Division Switch, BROADCASTING,
July 13, 1992, at 10.
66
DIXON,supra note 4, at 99.
O6 Kenneth L. Shropshire, Diversity, Racism, and Professional Sports Franchise
Ownership: Change Must Come from Within, 67 U.COLO.L. REV. 47,65 (1996).
48
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a securities offering." With limited financial resources, most owners
could not afford team synergy, and encountered difficulty in retaining
stars as their compensation increased each year. During World War 11,
the Negro Leagues thrived even though many of its stars served in the
military. Increased popularity meant higher gate receipts, which in
turn meant higher salaries for their players, especially the stars. In
1944,Satchel Paige, with a salary of $40,000 per year, was the highest
paid player in baseball.58
Although the weak relational contract structures of Negro League
teams made their success more difficult than that for White Major
League teams, those obstacles seem indistinguishable from those
confronting other Black institutions which survived integration. Black
colleges and universities faced similar obstacles, and the experience of
the ATA would not be expected to have been any different either.
Accordingly, the resulting competitive position of the leagues does not
sufficiently explain their extinction.

THEPOSSIBILITY OF SURVIVAL
The American Tennis Association and Black Colleges

The extinction of the Negro Leagues in the post-integration era was
consistent with the theories of some scholars of Black capitalism, most
notably Andrew Brimmer, a former member of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors and now the chairman of the District of Columbia
Financial Control Board. According to Brimmer, many Black firms
benefited from, and indeed preferred, segregation because of the absence
Although White fans attended Negro
of competition from White firms!'
League games, the teams faced virtually no competition from White
firms in the market for Black baseball players. Brimmer's theory would
predict that the Negro League teams would fail once better financed
White firms, i.e., Major League Baseball teams, began competing in that
market. The theory appears to predict the failure of the Negro Leagues
as well.
Brimmer's theory, however, only explains the preference for
segregated markets by Black-owned firms;it leads to the conclusion but
does not explicitly hold that the demise of Black firms is an inevitable
consequence of the integration of previously segregated Black markets.
In fact, it explains the extinction of the Negro Leagues only if Black
firms made no competitive response or any such response was doomed

'' DIXON,supra note 4, at 84.
Id. at 193.
Andrew F. Brimmer, The Negro in the National Economy, in "HE AMERICAN NEGRO
REFERENCE
BOOK251,291-92 (John Davis, ed., 1966).
68
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to be inadequate. The experience of other Black sports organizations in
the post-integration era suggests that integration alone is not a
sufficient explanation of the demise of the Negro Leagues or Blackowned teams.
The American Tennis Association is a case in point. The ATA was
founded in 1916 as the Black counterpart of the United States Lawn
Tennis
All the great Black tennis stars, including Arthur
Ashe and Althea Gibson, were nurtured in its tournaments. It has
continued to thrive in the post-integration era. It still holds an annual
national championship and many of today’s Black stars earn their spurs
there.
One reason the ATA may have survived, apart from the support of
the civil rights community, is that it has had a continuing role in the
nurturing and development of future African-American stars. Its
programs expose African-Americans in urban areas and elsewhere to the
game of tennis often using public facilities. Even Motown was assured
a continuing place in the music industry firmament by access to young
stars. The ATA also has another feature which it shares with
historically Black colleges. Its programs are frequently tied t o definable
African-American communities. Historically Black colleges and
universities may be viewed as extensions of the communities from which
their African-American students come, or a representation of a national
community.
Abe Saperstein and the Globetrotters
Negro League teams were not the only professional sports
organization featuring Black talent whose future was threatened in the
post-integration era. The Harlem Globetrotters, although not Blackowned, offered the most prominent professional opportunity for Black
basketball players until the Basketball Association of America, the
forerunner of the National Basketball Association (NBA),integrated its
player ranks in 1946.61Arthur Ashe characterized the position of the
Globetrotters in the market for Black professional basketball players in
the early 1940s as a monopoly. This characterization, while inaccurate,
comes close to describing their domination of that market. Unlike
would-be owners of Major League franchises who failed to exploit the
market of Black professional baseball players, Abe Saperstein acquired
that market position by taking advantage of the bigotry of other White
team owners who refused to deal with Black players.

M,

Eric L. Smith, A.T.A. Junior Development Program, BLACKENTERPRISE,
Sept. 1995,

at 115.
ARTHUR R. ASHE,JR., A HARD ROADTO GLORY:
A

ATHLETESINCE 1946,at 52 (1988).

HISTORY
OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
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However, the Globetrotters engaged in barnstorming and did not
belong to a league. They made their money traveling the country and
playing 150 to 170 games over a six to seven month season.62 Without
significant league sport competition, the Globetrotters became the most
popular professional basketball team in the world. The market position
of the Globetrotters was threatened by the racial enlightenment of the
owners of the NBA and its predecessors. The Globetrotters' domination
of the market for professional Black players was over; they would now
have to compete for the best players in that market. Indeed, the
survival of the Globetrotters was jeopardized because much of their
success was built upon a shortage in the supply of Black professional
players resulting from their exclusion from white-owned teams. The
advent of their inclusion on teams engaged in league sport led to an
enhancement of the quality of the league product and a n increase in the
supply of quality professional basketball product.
As the NBA's league sport gained in popularity, the fortunes of the
Globetrotters declined.63 Abe Saperstein, the then owner of the
Globetrotters responded to this challenge initially by cultivating a
relationship with the NBA.64 In the early days of the NBA, the
Globetrotters helped the league survive by scheduling games against
NBA teams or in conjunction with their games.65 He also owned an
interest in the Philadelphia Warriors, but that relationship soured after
the Globetrotters defeated the Minneapolis Lakers and the NBA adopted
an informal rule prohibiting member teams from playing the
Globetrotters.s Saperstein and the NBA also had disagreements over
his contributions to the NBA and game rules. The survival of the
Globetrotters was jeopardized by the difficulty of retaining access to
arenas in NBA cities and stiff competition for the best players.
Saperstein appears to have believed that the survival and success of
the Globetrotters depended upon a symbiotic relationship with a
professional league.67 He responded by founding the American
Basketball League (ABL) as a rival to the NBA.s8 Although some
Globetrotters were allowed to play in the new league, Saperstein did not
cause the Globetrotters to become a team in the league.
The ABL failed, but more because of inadequate financing than due
to the efforts of the NBA. Saperstein's hybrid league strategy thus
failed because of the inability of his collaborators to obtain suitable
Saperstein v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 916,917 (1970).

Id. at 919.
" Id. at 917.
63

'' Id.
"
"

Id. at 919-20.
Id. at919.
Id. at 918.
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relational contracts with other investors or financiers. The strategy had
some chance to succeed because unlike the Negro Leagues, neither the
Globetrotters nor the ABL confronted an NBA monopoly over the
business of professional basketball or the market for professional
players. In fact, the ABL was subsequently revived as the American
Basketball Association, which ultimately merged with the NBA. The
Globetrotters appear to have survived because of another strategy with
which Abe Saperstein is more commonly associated. He changed the
game product of the Globetrotters from entertaining with a highly
competitive basketball game to one involving the display of highly
refined basketball skills and clowning. It was a strategy pursued by the
Indianapolis Clowns that ultimately failed. Nevertheless, this product
alteration appears to have been the strategy that most accounts for the
survival of the Globetrotters. Today, they are the dominant supplier of
this product and are Black-owned.

Black High School Athletic Associations
The case of Black high school athletic associations provides an
example of Black institutions determined to survive integration in some
fashion. The Virginia Interscholastic Association was formed by Black
high schools apparently after Brown u. Board of Education was
decided.69The organizers explicitly formed it to provide leverage t o gain
admittance to the all-White Virginia High School League (VHSL).70One
by one, its members joined the VHSL and in 1969, the two organizations
merged.71 The association ceased to exist as an all-Black organization,
but its members entered the White league as equals. In other states,
efforts of Black high schools to attain membership in, o r Black high
school leagues to merge with White interscholastic associations resulted
in litigati~n.~’
Some Black high schools pursued the survival of their sports
programs through a civil rights litigation strategy. In St. Augustine, a
high school with an all-Black student body sought admission to the
Louisiana High School Athletic Association (LHSAA),then comprised of
high schools with integrated but formerly all-White student bodies. St.
Augustine High School was a member of the Louisiana Interscholastic

69 Tom Robinson, A League of Their Own, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
ANL) LEDGER-STAR,
Feb. 22,
1993, at C1. The VIA succeeded the Virginia Interscholastic Athletic League, which had
been formed in 1925 to govern only sports. The new association covered music and drama
as well. Id.
Id.
7’ Id.
72 See, e.g., Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1968) (effort to merge black and white athletic leagues); Lee v. Macon County Bd.
of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 1968) {same).
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Athletic and Literary Organization (LIALO), which was organized t o
coordinate the interscholastic activities of Black high schools.73 The
comparison of the LIALO to the LHSAA was akin to that between the
Negro Leagues and the Major Leagues. Prior to the application, no
Negro high school had ever applied for membership in the LHSAA.74The
LHSAA responded by amending its constitution to require the vote of
two-thirds of its membership to admit a new member instead of the
approval of its executive board. The LIALO did not seek a merger but St.
Augustine High School successfully challenged its exclusion on equal
protection gro~nds.'~
In Lee u. Macon County Board of Education,the plaintiffs challenged the practice of scheduling interscholastic athletic contests only among
schools within racially designated athletic association^.^^ The Alabama
High School Athletic Association was comprised only of White schools
and the Alabama InterscholasticAthletic Association was comprised of
Black schools. Both associations had promulgated rules prohibiting its
members from playing schools in the other association. The court found
that the segregation of athletic activities discriminated against Black
school^.^' Moreover, it found that the desegregation that had occurred
by admitting Black athletes who had exercised their freedom of choice
to play in the White association did not amount to de~egregation.~'
Again, the parallels between the relationship of the Black high
school association and the White association to that of the Negro Leagues and the Major Leagues is substantial. The court held that the unification of the two athletic associations by merger was required.79The
court went on to specify guidelines for the terms of the merger. Among
others, it stated that if the Black association was abolished as a result
of the merger, its executive director or its designee should be made an

St. Augustine,396 F.2d. at 225.

Id. a t 226.
Id. at 228-29.
'' Macon County, 283 F. Supp. at 196-97.
" The court described the effecta as follows:
Alabama's dual athletic system has led to inadequate athletic programs in the
various Negro schools. The Negro athletic association has not participated in the
statewide tournaments and contests that are the prime source of revenue for the
White athletic association. . . . This has resulted in inadequate financing of the
athletic programs far the Negro schools. The dual system has resulted in a loss of
recognition for athletes in the Negro schools-loss of recognition on both local and
national levels. The National Federation of High School Athletic Associations
recognizes only one association in Alabama: the Alabama High School Athletic
Association.
Id. a t 197.
" Id.
'' Id. at 198.
"
Is
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executive officer of the new association. It further specified that the
administrative staff should be desegregated such that both associations
held a significant number of positions on the governing board.'l
The Black high school experience is interesting because the parallels
of their experience to the relationship between the Negro Leagues and
the Major Leagues are so strong. Segregated Black high school sports
existed because of the exclusion of Black students from White schools.
Black school sports faced the same danger of extinction as the Negro
Leagues, but the civil rights litigation strategy contemplated the
integration of institutions as well as student athletics. That strategy
indicates that the concept of merger between Black and White sports
organizations existed in the civil rights community even as the Negro
Leagues faded into extinction. Perhaps, even if the Negro Leagues could
not have survived as an independent league, Macon County suggests
that one or more of their members-Black-owned teams-could have
joined or been made a part of the Major Leagues. The possibility of a
Negro League or Black-owned team joining the Major or minor leagues,
however, does not appear to have been considered seriously since the
F'ythian Club was denied entry into a league comprised of White teams
in 1868."
The record is unclear about the thinking in the White world on the
inclusion of the Negro League teams in leagues with White teams.
Branch Rickey, for example, formed a club called the Brooklyn Brown
Dodgers, which joined the United States Baseball League that Gus
Greenlee organized after he left the Negro National League. It is widely
believed that Rickey used the club as a subterfuge to scout Black players
in anticipation of breaking the color barrier in the Major Leagues.= The
USBL only lasted two months and there has been speculation about
Rickey's true purpose.84
Other than Branch Rickey's failed experiment with the USBL, there
does not appear to be any indication of the Major Leagues' interest in
integrating ownership. The lack of discussion was reflected in
Commissioner Frick's testimony before Congress in 1958 on Major
League Baseball's decision to permit the New York Giants and the
Brooklyn Dodgers to relocate to the West Coast in 1956:
Senator OMahoney: You were anxious to get Major League teams to
the West Coast. My question was, why did you not do it by creating
new teams?

83
84

Id. at 198-99.
Id.
DIXON,supra note 4, at 33-37.
BANKES, s upm note 48,at 138.
Id.
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Mr.k i c k We have no other clubs that wanted to come in, we had no
club that wanted to be created. . . When the time comes, to . . . expand
the league, it seems to me entirely proper that . . . the people who have
put their money in baseball in the minor league operation should be
entitled to have that club, not some other body come in from o~tside.'~
It is clear that the reference to the minor league operation "did not
include the Negro Leagues."86
The history of the Globetrotters may be illuminating on the interest
of White owners in integrating Black teams into White leagues. One of
the unanswered enigmas is why the Globetrotters did not become a team
in the NBA or the ABL. Abe Saperstein did enjoy relational contracts
with NBA team owners in the early years. The NBA managed to survive
in the early years by arrangements between NBA owners and
Sapertstein to schedule Globetrotter games in conjunction with NBA
games." "he quid pro quo for Saperstein was the access of the
Globetrotters to large arenas in NBA cities. Saperstein did, in fact, seek
a franchise in the NBA. His estate maintained in Tax Court proceedings
that his quest was unsuccessful because NBA owners insisted on a
$250,000 franchise fee and he was unwilling to pay it."
The court opinion implies that he intended to maintain the
Globetrotters as an independent organization and did not intend to
make the Globetrotters a league team. But why not? If the
Globetrotters could draw fans to NBA games by appearing on the same
bill, would not their inclusion as a league member have strengthened
the NBA? "he question is raised again with the formation of the ABL.
Saperstein, as its Commissioner, assigned some Globetrotter players to
ABL teams, but again indicated that he intended to maintain the
Globetrotters as an independent organization. The court did express
disbelief at the assertion of the estate that he wanted t o develop the
Al3L as a farm league for the development of talent for the Globetrotters
That disbelief rested on the court's view that such a relational contract
was impractical.
The question remains. Were the Globetrotters excluded from these
leagues because of an unwillingness of White owners to include a team
comprised solely of Black players? If the position of his estate is
accepted, the answer is no. Given the racial norms of the era, it is
plausible that race did play a significant role. If the Globetrotters were
Hearings, supm note 44, at 172 (testimony of Ford kick, then Commissioner of Major
League Baseball). M r . Frick was responding to questions about the moving of the Brooklyn
Dodgers and the New York Giants to the West coast.
86 See infru notes 92-114 and accompanying text (describingbaseball's reserve system
and monopoly power).
'' Saperstein v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH)916, 920 (1970).
Id. at 920.
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not able to obtain a seat at the league table, how much more difficult
would it have been in baseball? In any event, there appears to have
been little interest on the part of the civil rights community to come to
the aid of Negro League teams or their owners, whatever the
motivations of Major League owners.89 There was, however, such
interest when it came to tennis.g0 Even if such interest had existed, no
civil rights law existed that protected Black business owners from racial
discrimination in business dealing^.^'
If survival of the Negro Leagues as a minor league o r the entry of
one or more Negro League teams were possible after integration, why
did the leagues and the teams become extinct? The most likely culprit
appears to have been the monopoly power of Major League Baseball.

The Reserve System and Monopoly Power
By 1914, at least one court had recognized that the Major Leagues
had obtained a monopoly over the market for White professional players
via the reserve system. In American League Baseball Club of Chicago
u. Chase:2 a player signed a contract with a team in the Federal League
while under contract to the Chicago White Sox of the American League.
The court found that the Major Leagues had a monopoly over the
business of baseball and refused to uphold an injunction preventing the
player from playing for the Federal League team. The court stated that
it would not assist in enforcing an agreement that was a “part of a
general plan having for its object the maintenance of a monopoly,
interference with the personal liberty of a citizen, and the control of his
free right to labor wherever and for whom he pleases, and [would] not
extend its aid to further the purposes and practices of an unlawful
c~mbination.”~~
The monopoly referred t o in Chase was obtained through Major
League Baseball’s infamous reserve system, initially introduced in
1887.94
The reserve system was implemented through a series of clauses
in the Uniform Player Contract and the Major League Rules. The Major
League Rules imposed several limits on the right of individual clubs to
contract with players. These rules required individual clubs to use a
uniform player contract and prohibited them from including a

89 Arthur Ashe noted that the civil rights movement was very active in pressuring the
Major Leagues to take Black players. ASHE,supra note 61, at 9. But he also pointed out
that the NAACP itself was generally silent when it came to baseball. Id. at 57-64.
Id. at 160.
91 Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HAsTmGS L.J.
1257, 1263 (1991).
92 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
93 Id.at 20.
” Flood v. Kuhn, 407 US.258,259 n.1 (1972).
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nonreserve clause.95They prohibited individual clubs from tampering,
i.e., negotiating, contracting or dealing with a player under contract to
another member of the National or American Leagues.96 They
prohibited individual teams from contracting with a player who had
been blacklisted, i.e., declared ineligible, for violating the reserve
system.” The Uniform Player Contract imposed restrictions on players.
The UPC gave the team the right to enjoin the player from playing for
any other team during the term of the contract.98 It contained what the
teams construed as a perpetual renewal clause, thereby expanding the
term of the contract in perpetuity.” The UPC and Major League Rules
provided for the banishment of a player who breached the contract by
contracting with any other team which was not a member of the
American and National Leagues.lW
These restrictions gave Major League Baseball domination over the
White player market so that it could dictate the prices paid for labor in
that market. The restrictions on individual liberty and compensation
levels made the reserve system the target of frequent challenges by
players, sometimes successfully, in the lower federal and state courts.
For example, in Gardella u. Chandler, lo’ Daniel Gardella sued to
challenge his banishment from the Major Leagues when he violated the
reserve clause by playing professional baseball in the Mexican League.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and
allowed Gardella to sue on antitrust grounds.”’ In Martin u. National
the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s
League Baseball
refusal to enjoin a player’s banishment, but only because of a defect in
the pleadings.’@’
Courts historically have been inconsistent in the
issuance of such injunction^."^
In addition to the power to dictate prices paid for players, the
reserve system suppressed the supply of professional players available
for competitors. The precise accusation in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore u. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs, was that
the Major Leagues had “conspired to monopolize the base ball business”

”

Id.

’‘ Id.
Id. at 260 n.1.
’’ Id.
97

Id.
Id.
172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
lo2 Id. at 407.
lo’ 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id. at 918.
lo’ Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men‘s
Consciences and Women‘s Fidelity, 101 YALE L. J. 775 (1992) (discussing gender bias
against women in issuance of negative injunctions).
loo
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through the use of the reserve system.lo6 The Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore was a member of the Federal League which had competed
with the American and National Leagues. The latter leagues bought out
or induced every team in the Federal League except the Baltimore club
to join them. The gist of the Baltimore club's antitrust claim was that
the reserve system dried up the pool of skilled and talented players that
the Baltimore club needed to compete.
By this agreement players, before they could secure employment in any
club operating under it, were required to enter into contracts which, it
is alleged, gave the appellants control over practically all available
players of sufficient skill to serve in a Major League club, and thus the
Federal League was unable to secure players capable of producing such
exhibitions of baseball as the public demanded; and, in consequence of
this inability, disaster came upon the Federal League and its constituent clubs . . . .lo'

Similar claims were made nearly forty years later in Toolson u. New
York Yankees."* The complaints in that case contained numerous
allegations of the Major Leagues' control over the prices paid for players
through salary caps and wage scales." The plaintiffs also alleged that
Major League Baseball's monopoly extended beyond the player market
to professional baseball in the United States. The complaints contained
detailed allegations of territorial and broadcast restrictions. Moreover,
the complaint in Corbett u. Chandler contained allegations about Major
League Baseball's efforts to control and dominate the minor leagues by
acquiring minor league clubs as farm teams of the Major League
teams."'
Branch Rickey pioneered the utilization of the White minor leagues
as farm systems of the Major Leagues."' Players in those minor leagues
were also subject t o the reserve system.'" A player signing a minor
league contract was subject t o restraints like those of the Major
Leaguers. However, White minor league teams developed players and
made money by assigning the contract rights t o their stars to Major
League teams. The minor leagues thus controlled the market for White

Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 259 US.200,207
(1922).
lo'
Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 269 F. 681,683
(D.C.Cir. 1920).
InR
346 U.S. 356,362-64(1953)(Burton, J. dissenting). Toolson actually involved two
other cases that were consolidated for hearing in the Supreme Court; Corbett u. Chandler
and Kowalski u. Chandler.
log Toolson Record at 9-10,12-18.
'lo Id. at 5 .
GEOFFREY WARD &KEN BURNS, BA~EBALL
148-49 (1994).
Federal Baseball, 269 F.at 687.
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players who did not possess or not yet possess Major League skills.’l3
Branch Rickey drove the cost down for the Dodgers by acquiring
ownership interests in minor league teams. He promoted the
establishment of formal ties between Major League teams and minor
league teams to allow the Major League teams to grow their own
ta1ent.ll4
Major League Baseball’s monopoly was so powerful that it was
virtually impossible to own and operate a professional baseball team in
the United States without the explicit or tacit consent of the Major
Leagues. The Major Leagues not only directly dictated prices in the
player market but controlled the entry of firms into the market. The
implications of this extensive control on the Negro Leagues is obvious.
They were able to exist or survive only with the consent of the Major
Leagues. This reality for the Negro Leagues is only highlighted by the
failure of the Major Leagues, the minor leagues, or many would-be
entrants to recognize their existence before or after Jackie Robinson.
The plaintiff in Federal Baseball erroneously maintained that all
professional baseball players in the United States were under the
control of the Major Leagues. In all fairness, the Negro Leagues had not
yet been formed at the time of the complaint, but there were Black
professional players. The failure to acknowledge their existence
continued in Toolson. The complaints filed in 1951 contained
descriptions of the history of Organized Baseball in the United States
but did not include a single reference to the Negro Leagues. The
omission of the Negro Leagues in that history continued in
Congressional proceedings. The Report of the 1958 antitrust hearings
also contains a history of professional baseball without any reference to
the Negro Leagues.”’
Despite the omission of the Negro Leagues in its then official
history, Major League Baseball was very aware of their existence and its
ability to determine their fate. There is evidence that the Major
Leagues considered that the Negro Leagues would not simply die out if
the Major Leagues signed Black players, but that the Major Leagues had
the power to destroy them. The owner of the Washington Senators is
reported t o have acknowledged as much in a meeting with two stars of
the Negro Leagues.
Finally, Griffith [the owner of the Washington Senators] called [Josh]
Gibson and [Buck]Leonard into his office. . . . Ric Roberts is talking

‘I3 That relationship has been rocky. See Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. k i c k , 278 F.2d
395 (2nd Cir. 1960) (addressingthe Major League-minorleague relationship).
‘I4 Major League clubs owned minor league teams or entered into “workingagreements”
to establish a farm system of minor league teams. Hearings, supra note 44, at 197-99.
’I5 Id. at 193-94.
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about getting you fellows on the Senators' team. Well, let me tell you
something. If we get you boys, we're gonna get the best ones. It's
gonna break up your league. Now what do you think about that?'16

The comments seem to imply both the application of the integration
premise and the recognition of the Major Leagues' monopoly position.
The Major Leagues were wealthier and could outbid the Negro League
teams. That only explains their acquisition of the stars; it does not
explain their destruction of the Negro Leagues, which could only have
been accomplished through the exercise of the monopoly power Major
League Baseball had over the player market.
The death knell of the Negro Leagues thus appears to have sounded
not from the loss of their stars, but from the use by the Major Leagues
of its monopoly power. First, the Major Leagues subjected Black players
t o its reserve system, allowing it to dictate their price. Black players
who thereafter reached the majors were subject to the reserve system
once they signed their first Major League contract. Jackie Robinson was
not free to return to the Negro Leagues. Players were free, however, to
return if the Major Leagues lost interest as they did with Satchel Paige.
Integration thus meant that Negro League teams had to compete for
players in the market for professional baseball players over which the
Major Leagues maintained a monopoly. Second, in another exercise of
monopoly power, the Major Leagues eventually circumvented the Negro
Leagues by using their own scouting systems and signing Black players
out of high school, thereby cutting off the Negro Leagues from the pool
of potential talent as
Third, after the Negro Leagues lost their imprimatur as a major
league of baseball,'" they were precluded from operating as a minor
league to develop the talent pool of young African-American players.
Some teams did establish a relationship with Major League teams for a
while as unofficial farm clubs.11s That function, however, was usurped
by the Major Leagues with its use of the minor league farm system from
which Black players had also been excluded. When the Major League
teams started signing African-Americans out of high school, many of
them, as did Jackie Robinson, signed minor league contracts first. The
Negro Leagues were thus excluded from a possible niche as a developer

HOLWAY,
supra note 38, at 86-87.
Id. at 71.
Interestingly,the cases involving Major League Baseball's reserve system generally
fail to acknowledge the existenceof the Negm Leagues. In Hood u. Kuhn, 407 US.258,262
(1972), Justice Blackmun listed Satchel Paige among the greatest players in baseball
history but the opinion did not otherwise mention the Negm Leagues. The inclusion of
Jackie Robinson cannot be viewed as a tribute to them.
DIXON,supra note 4, at 303-4.
'16

'I7
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and nurturer of African-American talent. The Federal League became
extinct in part because it could not sign players once they were under a
minor league contract. One of the anticompetitive effects of the use of
the Major Leagues' monopoly power to eradicate the Negro Leagues was
that the number of professional opportunities for White and Black
players in the United States decreased.
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL

There are two basic scenarios under which some remnant of the
Negro Leagues could have survived. The best prospect for the leagues
themselves would have been as a minor league in which the players
were predominantly Black. The Negro Leagues could not have
continued as an isolated major league, but one or more of the teams may
have. Instead of integrating Black players into the player market, the
Negro Leagues as a group may have been able to force a merger with, or
gain the admission of one or more teams into, the Major Leagues. The
result would have been teams with Black owners and Black players.
Eventually, there may have been White players, but given the social
climate, it would have taken a while. Perhaps, inconceivable at the time
because of racial realities, the Negro Leagues had considerable leverage.
Simply put, players of exceptional skill were essential t o producing
Major League baseball. Without access to the players, a team could not
market Major League baseball to the public. The Negro Leagues had a
substantial number of such players, but showed no signs that they
appreciated the leverage that they had for shaping integration on their
terms."' No plan for survival was possible without a legal strategy to
effectuate it. At the time, legal recourse lay most likely in antitrust law,
because the monopoly power of the Major Leagues was then under
assault in the courts, and civil rights law, because segregation in other
venues was then under siege in the courts.lZ1 There is no indication that
the Negro Leagues considered any such strategy to bring Negro League
teams into the Major or minor leagues.
lZo Obtaining access to the players was an essential part of the subsequent strategy bf the
American Football League to force a merger with the established professional league. The
AFL's efforts are reflected in cases such as Houston Oilers v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.
1966) (AFL club sought injunction against player who tried to jump his AFL contract to
play in the NFL); New York Football Giants v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, 291
F.2d 471 (5th Cir.1961)(NFLteam sued An team Over player's services who had signed
mntracts with both teams); and Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp.
717 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (NFL sued to e4oin a player who tried to revoke his NFL contract to
play in the An). For a more detailed account, see MARK RIBOWSKY,SLICK:
"HE SILVER AND
BLACKLIFE
OFALDAVIS (1991).
lgl The American Football League precedent is applicable here as well, as it resorted to
antitrust litigation which ultimately led to a merger. American Football League v.
National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
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An Antitrust Strategy
The Negro Leagues could have embarked upon a two pronged
antitrust strategy. First, the exemption of baseball from the antitrust
laws provided by Federal Baseball was not the exclusive province of the
Major Leagues. It also applied to the Negro Leagues, notwithstanding
the failure of the courts to acknowledge their existence. Accordingly, the
Negro Leagues could have utilized the exemption to develop a reserve
system so that they would strengthen their control over the market for
Black professional baseball players. With a strong reserve system in the
Negro Leagues, Branch Rickey could not have signed Jackie Robinson
without negotiating with the Negro League owners, and they could have
insisted upon a Federal League-type solution. They also may have been
able to negotiate a reciprocal hands-off agreement similar to the compact
reached by CommissionerAlbert Chandler with the Mexican Leagues to
honor the reserve systems of each other.'22
The affirmative use of the exemption would have had several
drawbacks. A reserve system would have run counter t o the culture of
contractual freedom in African-American society. The owners would
have encountered substantial criticism for pursuing their own greed at
the expense of the players. Such criticism did appear when the Negro
Leagues established a uniform player contract after the Kansas City
Monarchs failed to receive compensation for Jackie Robinson.123 The
system would have required a stronger relational contract system than
existed in the Negro Leagues. Not only would the Leagues have had t o
enforce the system against players, but they also would have needed the
power to keep team owners in line. As noted above, the owners
frequently left the Leagues out of economic necessity. Moreover, they
would have encountered considerable difficulty in enforcing the reserve
system. The strategy would have required the availability of
experienced commercial counsel, and such lawyers were scarce in
African-American cornmunitie~.'~~
Second, the Negro Leagues could have pursued an antitrust
litigation strategy against the Major and minor leagues. Federal
Baseball was under challenge in the 1940s. In fact, at the time the
Supreme court decided Toolson, there were at least seven additional
cases pending in the lower courts.'25 One can only wonder how the
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Supreme Court would have decided Toolson if the Negro Leagues, or any
of its owners, had brought one of the companion cases. That claim would
only have been strengthened when the Major Leagues allowed several
clubs to move to new cities in the 1950s. These included the well-known
move of the Dodgers and Giants to the West Coast in 1958,and the
lesser known moves of the St. Louis American team to Baltimore in
1954,and the Philadelphia American League team to Kansas City in
1955. The move to Kansas City is especially notable because a
successful Negro League team, the Monarchs, had operated there.
The Negro Leagues would have added a completely different and
powerful dimension to the legal argument that Federal Baseball was no
longer good law. It would have been decided in the same year as Brown
u. Board of Education I , and the Supreme Court would have had to
answer whether the exemption extended so as to permit baseball to
segregate the professional baseball market. One effect of such a ruling
would have been the use of commercial law to address racial
discrimination in the commercial context.
The claim need not have been limited t o section 1of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. As the financial health of teams declined after the
signing of Jackie Robinson, the teams could have pursued a claim of
unlawful monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Major
Leagues would have had to defend a case claiming that it had directly
used its monopoly power first to segregate the market for professional
baseball players and then to destroy the businesses that had invested in
it.
The Civil Rights Strategy

The Negro Leagues and its teams may have pursued a civil rights
strategy. While history has recorded the NAACPs legal strategy t o
desegregate public schools, little attention has been given to the effort
to desegregate sports facilities in public parks, most notably golf courses.
The earliest reported battleground was in Baltimore, in Durkee u.
Murphy, in 1942.lZ6It was followed by Law u. Mayor and City Council
ofBaltimore, in 1948127
and Boyer v. Garrett in 1949.l" The legal fight
moved to Houston in Beal u. Holcombe, in 1950.'29 The legal theory of
these cases was that the golf facilities provided to Blacks when
compared to those provided to Whites violated the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.13* Cases challenging racially segregated

lZ8
lZ7

'**
IM

29 A.2d 253 (1942).
78 F. Supp. 346 (D.Md. 1948).
88 F. Supp. 353 (D.Md. 19491, uffd,183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
103 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Tex. 1950),reu'd, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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golf courses have continued into contemporary times, but the focus has
switched t o challenging private fa~ilities.'~'These cases were brought
under the principle of Brown u. Board of Education'32and modern civil
rights statutes such as Title I1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'''
The theories under which those cases were brought would not have
worked for the Negro Leagues, as they already had access to public
facilities o r at least the same facilities in which Major League teams
played. Negro League teams customarily rented Major League stadia
while the home team was away. An example of the practice may be
found in Dodier Realty, which involved a rent dispute over whether the
Cardinals were obligated to pay for electricity when Negro teams used
its stadium.lM Even if Negro League teams had been denied the use of
Major League stadia, a lawsuit giving them access in some cities may
have been a pyrrhic victory. The Negro League team would have needed
fans in the stadium and those fans left them after the Negro League
stars deserted them for the Majors.
The only plausible strategy would have been to challenge
discriminatory refusals to permit Negro League teams t o join the Major
Leagues, recognize them as a minor league o r join the National
Association of Professional Baseball Clubs, the official association of
various minor leagues. That would have required the Negro Leagues or
member teams to make such requests. Even this strategy would have
necessitated a novel legal strategy, but the Civil Rights Movement
prided itself on the development of novel legal theories. The specific
problem was t o find a law that made discrimination in commercial
dealings illegal, and as indicated above, Professor Suggs has argued that
there is no such law.135
It was theoretically possible to have brought an action under the
Civil Rights Act of 1870.136
After Jones u. Alfied H. Mayer CO.
I'' was decided in 1968,the lower federal courts recognized and construed section
1981 to prohibit racial discrimination in contracting. Since membership

13' See, eg., Brown v. Loudoun Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va.
1983)(challenge to a private club's admission policy); Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd.,479
F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1979),rev'd, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Wright v. Cork
Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (same).
13* 349 U.S.294 (1954). See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 303 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1962)
(challengeto racial segregation in city parks), rev'd, 373 U.S. 526 (1963);Evans v. Laurel
Links,Inc, 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966) (challenge to racially segregated golf course).
133 42 U.S.C. $2000a(b)(3), (c) (1994).
134 Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Natl Baseball Club, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 321 (Mo.
1951).
135 See supm note 91 and accompanyingtext (describinglack of legal protections against
discrimination in business transactions).
136 42 U.S.C. 4 1981a (1994);42 U.S.C.
4 12117(a)(1994).
13' 392 U S . 409 (1968).
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in a league involves a contractual relationship, a refusal to admit Negro
League teams would have been a rehsal to enter into or make a
contract. The Supreme Court upheld causes of actions under section
1981, as the Act is commonly referred to, challenging racial
discrimination in contracting in Runyon u. M~Crary.'~"That case,
however, was not decided until 1976. In Patterson u. McClean Credit
Union,'39the Supreme Court limited causes of action under section 1981
to those based on discriminatory refusals to form contracts, That
limitation is still broad enough to reach an action for a discriminatory
refusal to admit a Negro League team to the Major or minor leagues.
Antidiscrimination law may have provided a legal strategy for the
survival of the Negro Leagues as minor leagues or of some teams as
Black-owned teams. Nevertheless, antidiscrimination law eventually
would have restricted the ability of the Negro Leagues to be teams
explicitly comprised of Black players. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Negro League teams which made color a condition of
employment would have been in violation of Title VII and section 1981,
not to mention state antidiscrimination laws.140 Although in the 1960s
such teams were viable under the then status quo, they could have
expected to have been sued in the same manner as historically Black
colleges and u n i ~ e r s i t i e s . ' ~ ~

CONCLUSION
This article has argued that it may have been possible for some of
the Negro Leagues, their teams, or owners t o have survived in some
fashion. Perhaps the best opportunity for the Negro Leagues, that is
teams comprised of Black players and Black owners, to have survived
may have been as a developer and nurturer of young talent. Yet, the
history of Black high schools in the era after Brown u. Board of
Education suggests that some teams may have survived under Black
ownership with integrated players as members of a minor league. It is
virtually unthinkable that a Black-owned franchise with integrated
players could have joined the Major Leagues in the social milieu of that
era, although Negro Leaguers barnstorming against teams comprised of
White Major Leaguers was not uncommon. Given the talent in the
Negro Leagues, the absorption of one or more teams may have been a
possibility if the Negro League owners had understood the forces they

427 US.160 (1976).
491 U.S.164 (1989).
42 U.S.C.fj 2000 (1994).
14' See Whiting u. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980),and similar cases
where Whites have successfully sued historically Black colleges and universities for
employment discrimination.
13'
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faced, if the civil rights community had been as supportive of the owners
as they were of the players, andlor ifWhite owners could have overcome
their bigotry. Perhaps neither Negro League owners nor other observers
of the day could see the power that hit the Negro Leagues any better
than they could have seen a Satchel Paige pitch.142

14'

Security Union Title Ins. Co. v. Superior C t , 281 Cal. Rptr. 348,353(1991).

